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A recent series of reports in the New England Journal ofMedicine l - 3 have been
interpreted as providing support for the use of fetal brain tissue transplantation as
a treatment for Parkinson's disease." The publication of these studies also
provided impetus for President Clinton to repeal the administrative ban on the
use of federal funds for transplanting aborted human fetal tissue into patients.
Although this decision may be viewed by some as the end to a long political battle
between "pro-choice" and "pro-life" factions, such an assessment underestimates
the depth of the issues involved. The questions that have been raised on many
occasions regarding the ethical issues surrounding the use of tissue obtained from
the intentionally-aborted human fetus remain largely unanswered. s- n The
purpose of this article is to review such questions and to emphasize the unfinished
nature of the debate. There are three major ethical questions relating specifically
to the question of using fetal brain tissue for treating Parkinsons' disease: 1) When
can such a treatment be justified on medical grounds?, 2) What are the criteria
for defining fetal death? and 3) To what extent does the ethical status of abortion
affect the use of research or therapy based on tissue derived from aborted fetuses?
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Is Fetal Brain Tissue Transplantation Medically Justified?

The rationale for transplanting these neurons is that they will synthesize
dopamine, thereby replacing the neurotransmitter that is lost in Parkinson's
disease. Two features of the transplant paradigm that weaken the rationale are 1)
the transplant is placed into a brain region where the tissue is not normally located
10
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and 2) it is not possible to transplant only the cells of interest due to the inability to
identify and isolate the dopamine-producing neurons in the midbrain at this age.
As a result, interpreting the results obtained with such transplants is difficult since
it is not clear what feature of the transplanted tissue might underlie the observed
effects. In fact, the possibility has been raised that the effectiveness of the
transplant may depend on the surgical procedure itself, not the tissue. Further
support for this possibility is provided by the recent study from Yale in which the
one patient who came to autopsy demonstrated no dopamine-B-hydroxylase
activity in the transplant. 3 Additional skepticism arises from the experience of
using autologous grafts of adrenal medulla, which were initially reported to
provide substantial benefit l2 but were later found not to be efficacious. 13 , 14
The lack of strong evidence for a specific mechanism by which fetal transplants
might be expected to work, as well as the questionable efficacy of the procedure,
raise the first of many ethical questions regarding this procedure. Specifically,
should Parkinson's patients be submitted to a costly and invasive procedure for
which there is no compelling rationale? Even if the procedure is ultimately shown
to be effective, its relative effectiveness must be established. In other words, can
one obtain comparable results with less costly or less invasive therapy? In
addition, the human studies that have been carried out so far do not include any
controls for the transplant procedure. Therefore, the possibility of a placebo effect
needs to be kept in mind. This is especially true in studies where patients rate their
own status. 2
None of these questions relate to the issue of the source of the tissue (raised
below) yet they require as much attention as the abortion-related questions do.
One of the reasons that such issues get less attention is because the public is not in
a position to assess the medical and scientific evidence. However: there is
substantial disagreement within the medical and scientific community regarding
the rationale and effectiveness of tissue transplants as a therapy for Parkinson's
disease. IS Perhaps not surprisingly, the strongest proponents of the use of this
procedure are those who are carrying out the work. This is all the more reason
that dispassionate assessment is called for when evaluating the results of
transplant studies.

.

Defining Fetal Death
It is important to recognize that the fetus, or the desired organ, must be living to
serve as a useful tissue donor. However there is some disagreement about the
term "living." The traditional biological definition includes the concepts of
metabolism, growth, respiration, etc. Certainly, prior to the abortion, the fetus
meets all these criteria. The suitability of fetal tissue for transplantation depends
on the manner in which it is obtained. The ideal tissue is that obtained from an
intact living fetus. However, with rare exceptions, current abortion procedures
involve destruction of the fetus as an entity and corresponding destruction of the
fetal body and its tissues. Due to extensive tissue fragmentation, it may take a long
time to identify suitable viable tissue by quickly sifting through the remains
reSUlting from suction abortion. This delay can compromise the usefulness of the
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tissue. On the other hand, if the fetus is aborted relatively intact, it is much easier
to obtain the desired tissue with minimal delay. Thus, it remains to be seen
whether abortion procedures will be influenced by the demand for fresh intact
fetal tissue as apparently was the case for initial studies in Sweden.16 Whenever
researchers have a choice they prefer to use intact fetuses. One study assessed the
viability of human brain tissue at various intervals after the abortion.17 All of the
fetuses were obtained through prostaglandin-induced abortion. In other words,
the fetuses were delivered intact and, quite possibly, alive, depending on what
criteria of death are accepted as standard.
The most viable tissue for the purpose of transplantation is that obtained from
fetuses between 8 and 12 weeks gestational age. This is a stage before the nerve
cells in the midbrain have completed development and, therefore, retain their
capacity to form connections with target tissue. This is also a period of
development when the major brain and spinal cord architecture has been
established and the fetus exhibits motor and sensory capabilities. Whether an
8-week old fetus perceives pain is still debated but fetal response to noxious
stimuli and the presence of neural pathways that are known to subserve pain in
maturity strongly suggest that the fetus perceives some pain at this stage. This
issue has only been addressed tangentially in the political and scientific discussion
of the ethics surrounding the use of fetal tissue. Mahowald, et a~ 18 suggested that
if there was concern that the aborted fetus might perceive pain as a result of
acquiring tissue this could be dealt with by using appropriate anesthetics. The
irony of this suggestion is highlighted by the fact that abortion of a fetus at any
stage of development rarely involves anesthesia of the fetus since most abortions
are carried out under local anesthesia.19 The fetus is unanesthetized except in the
relatively uncommon circumstance of general anesthesia provided to the mother.
RegaPdless of the precise age at which nociception is established, there is little
question that the fetal brain is more resistant to anoxia and ischemia than the
postnatal brain.9This, along with the fact that many of the nerve cells have not yet
established connections with their targets, makes fetal tissue more suitable for
transplantation and tissue cultural studies than mature brain tissue. However, this
greater viability of the fetal brain, as compared with the mature brain, raises the
question of whether existing criteria for determining fetal death are sufficient to
prevent vivisection when harvesting tissue from the aborted fetus. There is no
question that most abortion procedures result in circulatory arrest. In fact, no one
can argue with the simple statement that "abortion stops a beating heart"
although the heart may continue to beat for some time 'after the abortion is
complete. However, the criterion of cessation of fetal circulation appears
insufficient in light of the continued survival of brain tissue both following
transplantation and in tissue culture.17 Furthermore, the possibility of using brain
death as the criterion for determining fetal death directly contradicts the goal of
harvesting the fetal brain in order to obtain viable tissue. Until we know more
about fetal perception it seems the most conservative course of action would be to
provide anesthesia for the fetus prior to the abortion procedure in order to
prevent the possibility of pain perception during the abortion or subsequent
harvesting of tissue.
12
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Moral Relationship Between Abortion and the Use of Tissue
From Aborted Fetuses
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Although it seems superfluous to review the semantics associated with using
tissue from the intentionally-aborted human fetus, there remains a surprising
level of ignorance on basic terms. The term human does not require further
qualification because there is no scientific disagreement that from fertilization
onward the organism is unquestionably human in the biological sense ofthe term
(that is, of the human species). It is not bovine or feline or canine and, with
increasingly sophisticated techniques, it can be demonstrated, from conception
on, to constitute a unique human individual using genetic, biochemical or
morphological criteria. Of course, the form each individual human organism
assumes changes cOntinuously throughout its life albeit at less dramatic rates than
when first developing.
There is also no disagreement that the biological organism constituted by an
individual zygote, embryo or fetus (each term representing different
developmental stages) is unique in terms of its developmental potential. Such
potential is contained within the genetic and cytoplasmic information of the
organism that, if appropriately nourished, will develop into a more mature
organism whose legal and moral status becomes universally accepted. Full
protectable status is now granted at a relatively late stage, i.e., at birth. Although
not the focus of this paper, it is of some interest that the latent legal doctrine on
which the "right" to abortion depends is that the mother has absolute power over
the fetus, that is, the fetus is completely dependent on the mother for survival (at
least during the first 20 weeks of gestation).
It is important to recall that the term abortion (Stedman's: 1. Giving birth to an
embryo or fetus prior to the stage of viability at about 20 weeks of gestation.) is
not equivalent to feticide. In fact, with some abortion procedures the living fetus
is expulsed even though it has limited viability (able to survive independently).
The AMA was well aware of this when passing resolutions condemning "the act
of producing abortion at every period of gestation, except as necessary for
preserving the life of either the mother or child." On the other hand it is possible,
and usually the case, to insure fetal death by destroying the fetus prior to her
removal. In fact, the gradual acceptance of vacuum aspiration as the method of
choice for "terminating" early pregnancy is often defended on grounds that it is
safer for the mother, but there is little question that another impetus for
developing such methods was to hasten the death of the fetus.
Thus, from a scientific point of view, the fetal donor is a living (or dying)
developing human being. The fact that the tissue is human, as opposed to deriving
from other species, increases the chance of success when using the tissue for
transplantation because of the reduced chance of immunological rejection.
Non-human animal tissue is simply inferior in this regard. The fact that the fetus is
in a stage of rapid development is also advantageous because the developing
nervous system undergoes a period of tremendous plasticity that can theoretically
be used to advantage when transplanted into a damaged adult brain or spinal
cord. As mentioned above, fetal tissue is also more resistant to injury and lack
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of oxygen, permitting it to survive the surgical procedures much better than
mature tissue.
The fact that the tissue derived from the human fetus is genetically unique is
only an advantage if attempts are made to match donor and recipient on
immunological criteria. Such matching is commonplace for organ transplants
between mature individuals in order to avoid rejection. The question of
immunological rejection has not been answered regarding fetal tissue transplants.
In one of the recent studies reported by Freed, et a~ 2 immunosuppressive therapy
did not seem to affect patient outcome. If immunological rejection did turn out to
be significant, this would create a problem for those who argue that the best way
to dissociate the transplant procedure from the abortion procedure is to insure
that donors and hosts cannot be specified. In fact, in the many guidelines that
have been suggested by various committees regarding transplantation of fetal
tissue, strict precaution is usually taken to insure that relatives cannot be
recipients of the human fetal tissue. 11,20 This is precisely the opposite of the case
when undertaking other types of transplantation where a related donor is much
preferred over a non-related donor.
Of course the other feature of developing human fetal tissue that makes it
especially desirable for research and transplantation is its widespread availability
and abundance. This is a direct consequence of the legality and practice of
induced abortion. As a result, it is clear that the ongoing research and
transplantation attempts depend on the continued availability of living,
developing human tissue and therefore, on the continued practice of induced
abortion. In this sense there is a direct relationship between the two procedures.
Whether this dependence provides additional incentive or conciliation for
women seeking abortion is debatable. There is no direct evidence bearing on this
question with the exception that in one survey some women stated they would be
willing to conceive and abort for the purpose of donating fetal tissue. 21 Although
the potential incentive for abortion provided the basis for the Reagan
administration's ban on federal funding of fetal tissue transplantation, recently
overturned by President Clinton, there are several more compelling arguments
for not only preventing the use of federal tax dollars to support such work but also
to ban experimentation on the aborted fetus. Much of the discussion on this issue
has failed to take note of the fact that federal funds can be, and have been, used to
support widespread research with human fetal tissue that does not involve
transplantation into human patients. Furthermore, even the administrative ban
on federal funding did not prevent the use of private funds for this work. The only
current restrictions that exist are individual state laws regulating experimentation
on the human fetus. 22
Returning to the relationship of fetal tissue research to the abortion practice
that makes the tissue available, several points should be noted. One is the amount
of the tissue needed for individual experiments. This has ranged from one2,3 to
several 1 fetal donors per patient. The availability of tissue from fetuses of the
desired developmental stage relies on the timing of abortions and access to the
aborted fetuses in a timely manner. These difficulties can be overcome by using
frozen tissue so that a tissue bank can be established to provide tissue as needed23.
14
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In fact, this approach was taken by the group at Yale. 3 Many ofthe proponents of
fetal tissue use favor this approach because it permits greater spatial and temporal
separation between the abortion and the use of the resulting tissue. Even so,
someone has to take responsibility for dissecting the tissue as it becomes available
to store for future use. The professional collaboration that must be established
between the investigators who use the tissue and the individuals who acquire the
tissue is evident from the fact that both types of individuals are listed as authors on
publications describing the work.24,2s In one case, one investigator who
collaborated on transplanting aborted fetal tissue also published his own
technique of acquiring the fetal brain tissue prior to carrying out the abortion
procedure.16
The problem of defining fetal death has already been addressed. A related issue
is the question of consent in donating fetal tissue or organs. The precedent that has
been established in other cases of tissue or organ donation is quite clear. Either the
donor provides such consent on his or her own behalf or it is provided on behalf
of the donor by someone who is considered qualified to represent and protect the
donor's interest. In the case of infant organ donation, since the infant is never
capable of providing such consent, the parents or guardians are usually the
relevant proxies. The one clear exception to this is when the parent or guardian
has directly or indirectly contributed to the demise of the donor. Thus, in the case
of aborted fetuses it seems unlikely that the mother can be considered an
appropriate proxy for the fetus that she has consented to abort. 6 Nor can the
abortionist be considered qualified to provide consent on behalf of the fetus he or
she destroys. By the same token, the medical personnel who desire to use the
tissue for research or transplantation should have no say in the decision for
obvious reasons. In fact, it may be impossible to establish a consent procedure
that is consistent with historical, ethically-sound practice.
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Some Personal Observations

Every year I attend the annual meeting of the Society for Neuroscience, a
gathering of scientists from around the country who study the brain. Every year,
scattered among the posters and talks describing new techniques and insights
gained from work on animals, are increasing numbers of studies using the human
fetus. This partly reflects the development of new methods but also stems from
the fact that there are many fetal human subjects available. Prior to 1973,
scientists had to rely on spontaneous abortions to obtain "material" while today
large numbers of healthy fetuses, aborted at various stages of development,
provide much greater opportunities for research.
Wandering the rows of posters at the meeting, I am struck by the extent to
which the human fetus has become just another experimental subject. In fact,
there are fewer regulations guiding the experimental use of the human fetus than
of most research animals. The philosophical and biological premise that humans
are neither more nor less than other animals is common today. In fact, unborn
humans aren't afforded the protection of "endangered" species or even of
experimental animals. Those who object to experiments carried out on the
May, 1993
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human fetus are usually less strident and violent in their opposition to human
fetal experimentation than, for example, the Animal Liberation Front is in
protesting the use of animals in research.
For scientists probing the mysteries of early human brain development, this is
truly a windfall and almost irresistable. Not only does our society permit, and
often encourage, women to "terminate their pregnancies," but victims of
neurological, or other, disease can now be recruited as allies to seek society'S
approval for therapeutic use of the aborted. After all, the reasoning goes, if the
tissue is going to be thrown away, why not let it be used to cure someone who has
Parkinson's disease or Alzheimer's disease? Why let the tissue go to waste? Of
course one obvious answer is that we should never permit such tissue to be
generated in this way in the first place. Another less apparent answer is that we
should treat fetal remains with the same respect we give to any other member of
our society who has died by natural or unnatural cause. Rather than discard such
remains in a trash bin, we should bury them with due respect.
Many physicians and scientists have historically used a common theme to
justify their experiments on those considered expendable. Note the plight of a
transplant team in Mexico, where abortion is still illegal. They say they were
"limited to the use of fetuses only from spontaneous abortions" but "encourage
those neural transplantation groups in countries where elective abortions are
legal, to take advantage of their social circumstance."26 In this country the social
circumstances are more favorable and the new administration now sanctions all
uses of the aborted fetus for medical research.
Surprisingly, proponents of abortion on demand and of the experimental use
of the aborted fetus claim that we can, and should, separate the practice of
abortion from the experimental use of the unborn. 8 It is objectionable, they say,
for a woman to abort for the purpose of donating tissue. It is deplorable, they
maintain, to think that any woman would sell her offspring for medical
experimentation. But advocates have difficulty defending their position. If a
woman has a fundamental right to abortion, why shouldn't she be able to provide
tissue for a relative or even sell to the highest bidder to generate income for her
other dependents? The scientists who study the tissue, the physicians who
transplant it and the patients who receive it, hope to benefit. Why not the mother?
Perhaps attempts to insulate the act of abortion from the use of the aborted
reflect a tacit admission that we have slid about as far down the slippery slope as
we can. It is said that the most telling attribute of a civilized society is the
protection it affords its most vulnerable members. Issues of concern to women
appeal to our legitimate desire to protect those women who have been exploited
by the biological fact that they are the only ones who get pregnant. It is no
surprise that many men support the "pro-choice" philosophy and the
corresponding reduction in sexual accountability. That mothers accept the death
of their offspring as a solution to their own vulnerability is harder to fathom
unless they are desperate. But many are also unaware of the true nature of the life
growing inside. Physicians and scientists could playa critical role in educating
them about the lives involved. There is no question that we need to take a hard
look at the issues surrounding "unwanted" pregnancies but still reject solutions
16
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that cost lives.
What is it about the human fetus that attracts scientists to "utilize" her? No
surprise. She is a living, developing, human being, as genetically and
anatomically distinct from her mother as she is from her father. By studying her
we study ourselves. If not "terminated", she will continue to develop, requiring
nurture and protection for many years after the direct physical link with the
mother is broken. But she is different from postnatal beings in a significant way.
For the first nine months she is hidden from view. Displaying her secret life of
kicking, sucking, jumping and responding to pain, requires modern technology.
When confronted with the evidence many women change their mind. But for
others the "solution" of abortion is too tempting to forego. Besides, educating the
public on these issues would cut into the many "benefits" of abortion such as
popUlation control, income for abortionists and experimental subjects for
scientists. Any discomfort that arises when confronting the aborted body parts is
tempered by rationalizing that autonomous rights of women outweigh any
conceivable rights of unborn "obligate parasites" or "non-viable" fetuses.
Ironically, the unborn are regaining status in our society. But only in the sense
that they are more valuable dead than alive. So the lucrative clinics stay open and
we solve our "problems" with technical skills refined for other purposes. And
now, there is the promise that we can reap additional benefits from their demise.
In the meantime, scientists gather together every year and compare notes, taking
advantage of their social situation. In fact, prominent scientist leaders defend this
practice. In a recent editorial" in -Science magaiinep -Ur. Koshland called for
"professionalism ... without emotionalism" regarding the question of federal
funding of fetal tissue transplantation research. He then provided arguments in
support of such research while characterizing those who object to it as playing a
"game of politics". He ignores scientific and ethical arguments raised against the
use of aborted fetuses for medical experimentation. He did not refer to significant
debate within the medical community, apart from the question of abortion, as to
whether or not fetal tissue transplantation really "is of enormous value and can be
used in actual therapy for certain illnesses like Parkinson's disease." Furthermore,
he suggested that "fetal tissue should be placed in the same category as research
on cadavers" without recognizing that there are valid medical questions
regarding the definition of fetal death as I have alluded to earlier.
More troubling is Koshland's insistence that science has no role in the wider
societal debate on abortion since "a death is preordained outside the research
world." This view is highly reminiscent of the defense offered by Nazi scientists
and physicians, such as Dr. Hallervorden, at the Nuremburg trials. If, as Dr.
Koshland asserts, taking a stand against the use of tissue derived from elective
abortion is "illogical" then the worldwide condemnation of many of the scientists
and physicians in Nazi Germany, such as Dr. Hallervorden, is also illogical. The
Nazi scientists argued, as does Dr. Koshland in support of fetal tissue, that they
were "making the best of the consequences of a previous history". After all,
"death was preordained outside the research world." They would also surely
ha ve agreed with Dr. Koshland that "the use of those materials should be termed
as unrelated to the political issues."
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Perhaps Dr. Koshland could defend his own position, while at the same time
condemning Nazi scientists, by adopting the view that feticide is fundamentally
different from the genocide practiced by the Nazis because the human fetus is not
worth protecting. If so, one must wonder why he states in the same editorial that
one of the goals of fetal tissue research is to treat "disease conditions in fetuses."
How is it that a human fetus can be considered a patient in one context and just a
source of tissue in another context? The answer is that in both cases the fetus is
considered valuable, but in the latter situation he or she is perceived as a
contributor to society, rather than a member, and more valuable dead than alive.
It is precisely this view of the fetus as a commodity that drives much of the
opposition to federal funding of research that depends on elective abortion.
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